

the uncontroversial idea that a correct representation must somehow *represent* the object as being the same as it actually is, must be converted into the much more controversial idea that a correct representation must somehow *be* the same as the object is. This means that correctly representing some feature of an object is interpreted as standing in some relation to *another* object that also possesses that feature. Knowing that the tree-in-itself is an elm involves standing in some curious relation to a tree-for-me that is an elm *in precisely the same sense* as the tree-in-itself. For the principle of the identity of indiscernibles to work, the object-for-us and the object-in-itself must not only be able to have the same features, they must also possess these features in the same sense. What this shows is that the argument from identity can contribute to the proof of withdrawal only if Harman is allowed to base his epistemology upon a metaphysical distinction (object-for-us/object-in-itself) closely resembling the distinction between the sensual object and the real object it is intended to demonstrate. The *fact* of a distinction between types of object is already given, even if its *character* is not.⁸⁹ To call this epistemology idiosyncratic would be an understatement.

89. This is an interesting contrast to the way the distinction between types of object emerges in *Tool-Being*, which sees it as a consequence of his reconstruction of the tool-analysis, rather than something already implicit in the analysis (258–9). However, the argument of this particular section is suspect (essence must itself have essence, ad infinitum) and does not seem to be repeated in any of the subsequent work. We will discuss this further in chapter 3.4, subsection V.