EXCERPT KAI PEATTIE: You’ve mentioned that, while you refuse to identify as either a Continental or an Analytic philosopher, you come from a Continental background. What drew you into Analytic philosophy? PETER WOLFENDALE: Funnily enough, I was drawn to Analytic philosophy first. I had no prior knowledge of philosophy when I went to study it at undergrad, and the first stuff I really got into was Karl Popper’s philosophy of science. I came to university with a reasonably uncritical faith in science, and, as is quite common, Popper’s falsificationism served to shape this faith into something slightly more sophisticated. I later bought into the Feyerabendian heresy, reading Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Against Method, but I eventually settled down and adopted something resembling the synthetic picture provided by Imre Lakatos. However, this initial encounter with fallibilism proved formative, even though it has since been channelled through my engagement with Hegel—a development that would disgust Popper and delight Lakatos.…