EXCERPT The object of realist metaphysics is generally thought to be to describe the structure of the world as it is in itself, or, alternatively, to determine precisely what is real. The purpose of this essay is to suggest that, although there have been many attempts to achieve this goal, they all fall down, not simply because they have misconstrued the nature of the in-itself or precisely what is real, but because, more fundamentally, they are not clear about what it is to talk about the in-itself or the real. In short, contemporary realism, both Continental and Analytic, does not have an adequate concept of reality. To demonstrate this point, I am going to rehearse a couple of different dialectics between realist and nonrealist positions in order to tease out their inherent problems. This will take up the first two parts of the essay. In the first part I will tackle Quentin Meillassoux’s reconstructed dialectic of correlationism and identify some key problems with it. In the second part I will examine several different debates within analytic metaphysics that exhibit a common dialectical structure, within which I will locate a position that I term deflationary realism. The final two parts will bring together the various considerations that have arisen, to show how we can move from deflationary realism to a properly transcendental realism in which the task of realist metaphysics is made properly explicit. In the third part I will define transcendental realism, and outline an argument for it. In the fourth part I will try to work out some additional consequences of the position, while further situating it in relation to the history of philosophy. In particular, I will try to show why the considerations put forward in the essay motivate a return to, and radicalisation of, Kant’s philosophical project.…