EXCERPT Just what are we talking about when we talk about the content of perception? There are a number of different questions which are often asked about the precise nature of this content, such as to what extent it is representational, and to what extent this representation is conceptual in character. However, these questions usually gloss over what it is to talk about perceptual content qua content, in their haste to talk about it qua representation or conception. On this basis, it is all too tempting to account for not only the specific character of the content, but also how it is individuated, in phenomenological terms. This is to say that perceptual content is understood as whatever is contained within an introspective domain to which we have some sort of special access. Wilfrid Sellars’s attack on the myth of the given has provided us with good reason to doubt the epistemic authority such special access to our inner states purportedly provides, and thus to doubt the efficacy of any account of perceptual content that gives introspection such a fundamental role.…